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1. General situation of the labour market 
 
The reemergence of labour brokerage is an overt phenomenon in the context of the process of 
economic restructuring in current China. At present, China faces three major employment 
challenges: successive mass labour migration from rural to urban areas; increased unemployment 
and job-change deriving from the government’s efforts to reform debt-ridden state-owned 
enterprises; moreover, every year about 10 million people of a new workforce are going to enter 
the labour market. While a mass workforce continuously is entering the labour market in urban 
areas, they need to be channeled into salaried working positions. Therefore, various employment 
agencies, which had disappeared for decades during the period of the Planned Economy System, 
have flourished in recent years.  
Table I: Current situation of the labour market in China (at the end of 2002) 
 
Items Total Number 
Total population of China 1.3 billion 
People living below the poverty line I 
(Average annual per capita income less than 625 yuan) 28.2 million 
People living below the poverty line II 
(Average annual per capita income less than 825 yuan) 90 million 
Rural labour force living in urban areas 120 million 
Unemployment of original urban workers 14 million 
New workforce entering labour market per year 10 million 
Source: the relevant statistics are quoted from Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s report. 
 
In the inland areas of western China, many people are looking for jobs in the more developed 
areas of Southeastern China as the best way to get rid of poverty. In accordance with a survey 
conducted by a research group of CASS (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) in 2002, 
comparing the income of migrants with their income in their original rural areas, on average, the 
interviewed rural labourers reported that their income had risen 8738.3 yuan per year. The 
following table discerns the increase of income of the rural labourers after taking over work in 
urban areas. Among them, about 20 percent gained an annual increase of more than RMB 10,000 
and 52.4 percent an increase of more than 5,000 yuan. It is obvious that great difference is a 
remarkable driving force which motivates rural labourers to move to urban areas. 
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Table II: Increased income of rural labourers after working in urban areas 
 
Increased amount per year (RMB yuan) Number  % 
24,000 and above 16 5.9 
10,000—23,999  38 13.9 
6,500—9,999 43 15.8 
5,000—6,499 46 16.8 
3,000—4,999 52 19.0 
1,000—2,999 47 17.2 
200—999 4 1.5 
Income is the same as in my hometown 16 5.9 
The income is lower than before 11 4.0 
Total 273 100.0 
Source: Li Qiang 2003. 
 
Xiamen, one of the first four Special Economic Zones in China,1 has been regarded as a 
developed area with rich economic opportunities for rural labour. Still, the total amount of local 
people who are waiting to be transferred from rural to urban areas is huge. At the beginning of the 
21st century, Xiamen was a city with in total 650, 000 rural labourers. The urbanization process 
has decreased the farmland rapidly, particularly at the suburbs of Xiamen. After having received a 
certain amount of compensation for giving up their land, the suburban peasants need to find a job 
in urban areas. In accordance with the ten year plan of Xiamen Municipality, by the end of 2010, 
about 300, 000 rural labourers should be transferred into industrial workers. In addition, in the 
last two decades, mass migrants have arrived in Xiamen from various rural areas. Table III shows 
the increase of rural labour in Xiamen. 
 
Table III: Total Amount of rural labourers in Xiamen 
 
Year Registered Rural Labourers 
Rural Labourers: 
Permanent Residents Source 
1988 12,000  Apr. 6, 2002, Xiamen Daily 
1992 80,000  Apr. 6, 2002, Xiamen Daily 
1994 180,000  Apr. 6, 2002, Xiamen Daily 
2001 400,000  Apr. 6, 2002, Xiamen Daily 
2002 610,000 45 % Dec. 13, 2002, Xiamen Daily 
Total Rural Labourers 
(registered & unregistered) 
  
2001 ≈893500 65 % Dec. 13, 2002, Xiamen Daily 
 
According to an investigation conducted by the relevant authorities of Xiamen at the end of 2002, 
among the successive rural-city migrants, only 3.87 percent were self-employed, but 83.5 percent 
were permanent or temporary workers, or were trying to find a salaried work. This group 
primarily comprises low-educated, unskilled labourers; moreover, most of them do not have 
strong ties in the city. The following data were derived from my questionnaires in Xiamen.2  
                                                        
1 The first four Special Economic Zones in China are Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen, which were 
established at the beginning of the 1980s.  
2 Between January and September 2001, in order to discover the actual functions of labour brokers from the 
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Table IV: Educational level of blue-collar workers in Xiamen 
( %) 
Items A (255) 
B 
(259) 
C 
(95) 
D 
(48) 
E 
(79) 
A few years in primary school  0.8 6.6 1.1 0 0 
Primary school graduates 2.0 6.2 1.1 0 0 
A certain middle school education 11.8 12.7 9.5 4.2 2.5 
Middle school graduates 32.2 35.9 32.6 31.3 5.1 
A certain high school education 10.0 13.5 10.5 2.1 10.1 
High school graduates 18.4 18.5 14.7 41.7 40.5 
Vocational school graduates 16.9 4.6 20.0 20.8 22.8 
Vocational college graduates 4.7 0.8 9.5 0 6.3 
University graduates 3.1 0.4 1.1 0 11.4 
A. The respondents were people without a fixed occupation or still hunting for a salaried job when interviewed. 
B. The respondents were workers in construction sites. 
C. The respondents were workers of small-scale companies based on simple technology (with about a dozen of 
employees). 
D. The respondents were workers of Taiwanese invested enterprises. 
E. The respondents were workers of European or American invested enterprises. 
 
2. Development of current labour brokerage business 
 
The general situation of the labour market in current China shows a clear contrasting 
phenomenon: on the one hand rather few job opportunities, on the other hand a huge amount of 
job-hunters in urban areas; moreover, successive unskilled rural labourers continuously flow into 
the urban labour market. All of them strive to find an ideal job as soon as possible. Thus, the local 
labourers who are looking for a job plus the successively arriving migrants have created a huge 
market for labour brokerage business. 
 
In order to understand the meaning of the re-emergence of a labour market and labour brokerage 
in China today, it is necessary to give a brief review on the labour recruitment system in China 
prior to the 1980s. Generally speaking, a central feature in pre-reform China was that salaried 
employment was heavily regulated and controlled by the state, no matter whether the relevant 
occupation was a professional, administrative or simply unskilled work. In every city, two 
municipality bureaus were in charge of salaried job assignment. One was the Personnel Bureau, 
which was responsible for the assignment concerning cadres and professional occupations. The 
other one was the Labour Bureau. The duty of the latter was to be in charge of salaried workers’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
perspective of job hunters, I conducted a survey among newly in-migrated labourers in Xiamen. The survey was 
conducted by means of a questionnaire given to the relevant people. Two largely identical but slightly different 
questionnaires have been designed. One was filled out by newly in-migrated labourers who are factory workers, 
labourers in the informal economy, or still looking for a job (to simplify description, this part of responders will be 
named Group One). The other questionnaire was designed for newly in-migrated people who belong to the 
white-collars, that is, middle-level administrators, head of workshop or production lines, technicians, etc. (hereafter 
called Group Two). Originally, I planned to distribute 1,000 questionnaires. By the end of September 2001, in total 
989 questionnaires were distributed and 959 copies have been filled in and taken back. Among them, 785 
questionnaires were distributed to Group One and 755 have been filled in and collected. For Group Two, 204 copies 
were distributed and filled in.  
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allocation. In short, in the period between the mid-1950s and the 1970s, all salaried occupations 
had been under the assignment of the relevant government offices and, moreover, a 
comprehensive control of the hukou system (permanent resident system)3 made rural-urban 
migration difficult. During that period, if somebody wanted to get an urban job, regardless of 
whether it was a skilled or a unskilled job, he needed to have an urban hukou first and was 
dependent on the assignment of a job by the relevant governmental bureau. Furthermore, job 
assignment was rather uniform. All people who were qualified for a job had to accept the job 
assigned by the government. Transfer of personnel was also an official decision to obey. If 
somebody rejected an assigned job, he or she had to give up his or her right to get a salaried job, 
and which, in pre-reform PRC, has been regarded as the only means to make a comfortable living 
in urban areas. This had been the basis of the danwei system (work-unit system)4 (cf. Chan & 
Zhang 1999; Cai 2001; Li 2001).  
 
The economic reforms which started at the end of the 1970s brought about a great change in 
China. This is also true for the domain of labour and personnel. Interestingly, in order to meet the 
demand of labour export the Chinese government initiated the first group of employment 
agencies in the late 1970s. During the Mao period, China had carried out a series of development 
aid projects to support friendly nations. At the very beginning, to work abroad for these projects 
was a part of the government’s assignment. The people who were sent by the Chinese 
government were named “honorary volunteers”. Those who were selected had to match at least 
two standards: first, the person should be loyal to China and her cause; second, the person should 
be highly qualified for the duty and full of dedicating spirit. Since the 1980s, however, along with 
the reform of foreign policies, China’s projects based on rendering economic development aid 
assistance was, step by step, replaced by a foreign economic cooperation program based on 
mutual benefits. Then, the pursuit of commercial profits was no longer a taboo. Gradually, a few 
labour agencies with limited authority had been established under a special permission of the 
local government. 
 
In 1977 Xiamen Municipality set up the Foreign Aid Office. Literally, the major task of the office 
was to organize qualified technicians or skilled workers to work in the frame of China’s foreign 
aid programs. Although at the very beginning, the relevant “volunteers” were selected among the 
workers and staff of the state-owned sector rather than an open recruitment, this step marked the 
beginning of a meaningful transition of the comprehensive job assignment system. Since the end 
of the 1970s, when commercial labour exportation projects between China and foreign companies 
were initiated, more and more workers were needed to work abroad. Then, under the reformed 
foreign policy, in June 1980, the Xiamen Foreign Construction Company was established that 
took over the task of recruiting labourers to work abroad. The Company was still affiliated to the 
Foreign Economic Cooperation Office of Xiamen Municipality and had to deal with labour 
exportation under the special authorities issued by the latter. Nevertheless, the establishment of 
this company was a turning point, as a new institution, although then a semi-government 
                                                        
3 In pre-reform PRC, the hukou system assigns every person not only a place of residence but also the status of 
“agricultural” or “non-agricultural,” which could rarely be changed. The newborn baby always succeeds the mother’s 
hukou status. 
4 In pre-reform PRC, all salaried jobs were assigned by the relevant government bureaus. It has been regarded as a 
normal way that people should work for the unit to which they have been assigned for their entire life. And the 
work-unit has the responsibility to take care of its employees in a comprehensive way. 
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institution, started to be in charge of labour recruitment. In 1984, the Xiamen Foreign 
Construction Company officially stopped its affiliation relation to Xiamen Municipality and 
became an independent corporate body. Since then, it was renamed Xiamen International 
Economic and Technical Cooperation Company (XIETC Company). Its task still was primarily to 
recruit labourers under foreign contracts.  
 
In Xiamen, during the early 1980s, the majority of recruited persons to work abroad were sailors. 
The majority worked for international shipping companies that had their general offices set up in 
Hong Kong. Since its establishment and until the end of the 1980s, XIETC Company was the 
only company authorized by Xiamen Municipality to deal with labour recruitment for formal 
exportation. In the early 1990s, although more companies joined that business, XIETC Company 
had kept its position of the number one recruitment institution until the mid-1990s. During that 
period, XIETC Company had derived huge profits out of the labour recruitment business. 
According to its public reports, concerning the business of labour exportation, from 1981 and up 
until 1995, the total turnover was about 161 million US-$ and the net profit reached 30 million 
US-$ (XMMYZ 1998:272). The huge profits were connected to the fact that the XIETC 
Company had a monopoly in the market.  
 
Since the early 1990s, however, XIETC Company’s recruitment business has been greatly 
challenged. When China clearly claimed its transition from a planned economy to a market 
economy, more and more companies attempted to jump into labour recruitment business. During 
the period 1992 and 1995 alone, at least five new companies were authorisized to deal with 
export-orientation contracted labour recruitment. But the labour market for internal recruitment 
was in reality far from being an open entity. 
 
As mentioned previously, the economic reform program which was initiated in the late 1970s 
generated major changes in China’s labour market. One of the consequences was that, when the 
hukou system could no longer function as a fixed boundary to separate urban and rural people, 
millions of rural people rushed into urban areas where more salaried occupations were available. 
When rural labourers rush to find their fortune in urban and industrial areas, they have to find 
workable job-hunting channels. First of all, logically, all personal strong ties were used for 
job-hunting. When those people decided to leave their original villages for urban areas, normally 
the relevant rural people would select the city where they could find relatives or friends: Thus 
they expected the latter to provide help, that is, to offer lodging and support in order to find job 
opportunities. In the following, I will demonstrate this by means of a typical example: During the 
late 1960s, a movement launched by Chairman Mao sent thousands upon thousands of school 
graduates to the countryside. They were requested to live and work together with the peasants, in 
order to get reeducation. It was not before the late 1970s, after the ending of the Cultural 
Revolution, that the post-Mao government decided to let these urban young people return to their 
original cities. During that period about eighty thousands school graduates from Xiamen were 
sent to the mountain villages in Longyan District. After spending a couple of years in those 
mountain areas, many had built up relationships to local peasants. Thus, when the first tide of 
rural to urban migration emerged, many Longyan peasants simply selected to come to Xiamen 
and to come into contact with those returned young people from Xiamen with whom they had 
developed some kind of a relationship. Due to this historical background, the migration chain 
between Longyan and Xiamen began to develop. 
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However, merely a few rural people possessed such workable ties. Moreover only a few urban 
people could match their expectations and help them to find a job. New channels were necessary. 
Therefore, since the mid-1980s, a couple of street corners in the downtown of Xiamen gradually 
became the earliest “job-hunting places” that is, a kind of rudiment labour market for informal 
internal labour recruitment. One of the first job-hunting corners in Xiamen appeared in front of 
Siming Cinema, which was located at a crossroads where the South Siming Road and the West 
Siming Road meet. Early in the morning, dozens of sometimes more than one hundred people, 
mostly from outside Xiamen city, were waiting there in order to find a job. Many carried simple 
luggage in their hands. As state-owned enterprises could not easily employ rural workers, the 
people who went to recruit labourers basically belonged to two groups. One group was composed 
of private contractors looking for cheap labour. Another group of “employers” was composed of 
local people who wanted to find a baomu (nursery maid) or cleaners. Almost from its beginning, 
some people were active among the persons looking for a job. Most of the were local people from 
Xiamen city. They went there frequently and tried to get in contact to the newcomers. When an 
employer came to look for labour, such people would attempt to give suggestions and help to 
bargain between the two sides. They also distributed information concerning reasonable wages 
and working conditions, advised newcomers to go to a certain place to meet potential employers, 
etc. Sometimes the newcomers were asked to pay for information or help; but in many cases the 
newcomers would pay some money in exchange for potential help. Actually, these corners can be 
comprehended as the earliest reemergence of informal labour agencies and the actors as the first 
informal labour brokers in Xiamen. 
 
Almost from the first day of its appearance, these informal job-hunting places had a bad image 
among the local media. These places were described as black markets where cheating was 
flourishing. It was reported that as no reliable references could be found from such a street 
employment, the recruitment was uncertain, or even dangerous towards both employers and 
employees. Reports concerning various frauds between employers and employees could 
frequently be found in local newspapers. Moreover, those brokers were sharply criticized as 
criminal procurers. According to an official opinion, these black corners were like dirty drops that 
spoiled the city. Moreover, from the perspective of the relevant authorities, the existence of such 
uncontrolled areas revealed their breach of duty because it offended the comprehensive system of 
regulation. Being troublesome places, these informal job-hunting corners were often “cleaned up” 
by the relevant local authorities during the early years of their appearance. This “clean up” 
movements, however, showed little result as the job-hunting places were needed by the people 
who had neither special skill nor the necessary helpful relations within the city. Similar corners 
reemerged almost immediately after the accomplishment of a clean up movement. Moreover, the 
people who had been involved in the street employment increased. True recruitments and 
cheating affairs were happening at the same time. 
 
The turning point was around 1992. As mentioned earlier, this was also the year when more 
companies have been issued authority to recruit labourers for foreign contracts. By then it finally 
became a consensus that the unified allocation or employment system controlled by the state was 
far behind the times. Actually, an informal labour market had already existed for quite some years. 
The fact made relevant authorities recognize that the inflow of mass migration into urban areas 
like Xiamen would further increase and hence require active labour brokers to engage in formal 
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labour market services rather than simply clean up the informal job-hunting places. In order to 
regularize the labour market, the two authorized bureaus of the municipality – the Labour Bureau 
and the Personnel Bureau of Xiamen Municipality – began to establish official employment 
agencies. 
 
In the mid-1990s, the recruitment agencies had become official authorized entities within Xiamen. 
Two kinds of formal recruitment service centers had been set up in Xiamen. One is the Center for 
Talents Intercommunion affiliated to the Personnel Bureau and the other one the Labour Service 
Center affiliated to the Labour Bureau. Instead of directly claiming themselves as recruitment 
agencies, both stressed their roles as service institutions. The former one is assigned to help 
college or university graduates or people having a higher professional level. The latter one has 
been assumed to channel the common job hunters. In fact, the establishment of these agencies 
marked the end of the unified assignment system although they still belong to the state-run 
entities. Soon after that, various recruitment agencies were established.  
 
By the 1990s, step by step, the unified job-allocation system that had existed in China for about 
three decades has been replaced by an open labour market. Labour brokerage has reemerged and 
become involved in people’s life more and more widely and deeply.  
 
3. Features of labour brokerage 
 
What is the collective future of the reemerged labour brokerage in current China? First of all, it is 
worth pointing out that the large oversupplied unskilled and low-skilled labour has to be 
considered as a crucial background in order to understand the general features of labour 
brokerage in today’s China.  
 
3.1 Short history but rich varieties 
Meanwhile the reemerged employment brokerage was accepted by both government and people 
nearly for about one decade. However, the relevant labour brokerage has already shown a rich 
variety in its manner of organization and functioning. Basically, the employment brokerage can 
be divided into three types. The first and biggest type is engaged in labour recruitment that has 
been named as “Labour Market.” The second one is to channel professionals (e.g. graduates of 
colleges or universities), which usually has been named as “Talent Market”. The third one can be 
regarded as something like senior headhunters, which still are few in number. Moreover, instead 
of using the name “headhunter” many just have named themselves as “high-tech service centers” 
or “senior executive markets”. In today’s Chinese society, “headhunter”, from its name to its 
operating model, still is strange to most people.  
 
In view of the initiators or investors, the relevant labour brokerage can be roughly divided into 
four categories: 
a. An official branch or extension of the relevant government bureau 
b. State-owned companies 
c. Private entities with legal status, including branches of transnational companies  
d. Informal or illegal brokers 
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For instance, according to an officially published report, by the year 2000 there existed more than 
4,100 registered labour agencies all over China.5 In Xiamen, at the end of 2001, that sector 
consisted of thirty-nine formally registered employment agencies and several dozens of so-called 
“re-employment training centers”. 6  Among them, the biggest recruitment agency for 
professionals is the Xiamen Center for Talents Intercommunion, which has been affiliated to the 
Personal Bureau of Xiamen Municipality. In October 2000, this center was divided into two 
separate state-owned companies. One is concerned with the channeling of college and university 
graduates into employment; the other one is named “Xiamen Assessment and Recommendation 
Center of Senior Executives”, which major task is to find high-qualified managers or 
high-ranking administrators for large-scale enterprises. Next to this Center, there are two 
state-owned headhunting companies as well. They are: the Xiamen Senior Executives Market and 
the Xiamen Senior Executives Corporation. Both of them can be regarded to follow the model of 
focusing on headhunting, that is, senior executive searching.  
 
Among the labour recruitment agencies, the largest one is also the one affiliated to the Xiamen 
Labour Bureau, which was later renamed to “Service Center for Immigrant Labour in Xiamen”. 
However the common name used by job-hunting labourers is “Xiamen Labour Market” or 
“Xiamen Labour Edifice”, because it is located in a huge building. This Labour Market has 
occupied three floors. One floor is for its staff members, another one consists of a huge hall, 
where, on the one side, a wall-wide electronic board is advertizing job information. On the other 
side there are dozens of counters divided into two groups: one group consists of the staff 
members of the Center to receive customers; the other group includes the representatives of the 
relevant employers interviewing applicants. Downstairs a couple of rooms are used for training 
classes. One class is reserved for all applicants. The latter have to attend such classes before they 
can get a certificate that entitles them for a job in Xiamen. Other classes provide various 
vocational trainings, such as cooking, painting, sewing, primary computer typing, document 
editing, etc. It is worth pointing out that this Labour Market frequently turns to government 
authorities in order to attain relevant enterprises’ cooperation. For instance, regularly, the Market 
will ask some well-known enterprises to send their representatives to recruit new hands. The 
operating model of a dozen of labour agencies affiliated to the relevant district government 
offices is similar to that of the Xiamen Labour Market.  
 
Except the state-owned labour markets, there are dozens of recruitment agencies which are 
officially registered as private agencies. Following the models of the municipality-run centers, 
informal labour brokers that had already existed for some time also attempted to get formal 
registration. Among the newly established recruitment agencies, those dealing with unskilled or 
low skilled workers have rapidly developed. Some recruitment agencies have focussed on 
transnational brokerage, from exporting contracted unskilled or low skilled labourers. Moreover, 
it is not unusual that some also include in their business labour emigration, study and marriage 
abroad. The total number of private labour agencies is continuously increasing. Furthermore, 
albeit the relevant authorities have strived for to control labour brokerage, many informal labour 
agencies/agents continue to operate. As they are not legal entities, it is difficult to get the exact 
                                                        
5 Quoted from a wrap-up report printed in Haixia Daobao (Straits Guide), August 14 2001.  
6 The re-employment training center is a special unit to help lay-off workers of state-owned companies. Some were 
set up by the relevant government offices; some were set up by the relevant companies. The total number is difficult 
to estimate. 
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number of them, as many appear and disappear here and there. According to my research, the 
exact number of informal labour agencies is much higher than the officially registered ones.  
 
Compared with the four categories of labour brokerage listed above, the first two possess a more 
powerful background but less flexible channels while the latter two, in contrast, are without a 
powerful background but actively use formal and informal, legal and illegal strategies in 
channeling labourers. Concerning their functional spheres, some are operating locally and 
temporarily only. For instance, during the late 1990s, when a considerable amount of lay-off 
workers of the state-owned industry had become a crucial problem to be solved, in total 1,102 
“re-employment centers” had been established within Fujian Province (Xiamen is a city under the 
jurisdiction of Fujian Province). Most were under the guidance of the relevant government offices. 
However, by the end of 2002, an official report announced that all relevant centers had been 
closed after finishing their tasks (Xiamen Daily, 13 January 2003). In fact all of these Centers 
were an extension of the relevant government’s offices.  
 
3.2 A highly profitable business 
Today, thousands of people are competing for a job. Meanwhile, this has become a phenomenon 
not unusual in today’s China. The following tables were elaborated on the basis of a working 
report given by the Xiamen Labour Market. It needs to be pointed out that many rural labourers 
may have gone to other recruitment agencies, therefore the total amount of labour applicants must 
be much higher than the numbers shown in the following tables.  
 
Table V: job-hunting people and occupations available according to age groups 
                                            (Jan. – Mar. 2003) 
Age Group (A) Applicants
(B) 
Occupations Available (A) : (B) 
16-24 69385 41063 1.69 
25-34 18423 9332 1.97 
35-44 5549 566 9.80 
45+ 2564 143 17.93 
 
Table VI: The 10 Most Oversupplied Occupations (Jan. – Mar. 2003) 
 
Occupation (A) Occupation Available
(B) 
Applicant Oversupply B: A 
Driver  266 1697 1431 6.38 
Salesperson  2018 12464 10446 6.18 
Secretary  325 1849 1524 5.69 
Watchman  666 3756 3090 5.64 
Cleaner  924 4973 4049 5.38 
Cashier  562 3012 2450 5.36 
Technician  265 1292 1027 4.88 
Packer  1915 7817 5902 4.08 
Restaurant Waiter 7204 22438 15234 3.11 
Bar waiter 2501 6852 4351 2.74 
On average 4.94 
Source: Working Report of Xiamen Labour Market, in Xiamen Daily, 8 April 2003. 
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As their exists a large surplus of labour, it is imaginable that labour brokerage business is highly 
profitable. In the Xiamen Labour Market mentioned above, the applicants from outside Xiamen 
have to pay 30 to 50 yuan to get the relevant working permits in Xiamen; moreover they have to 
pay for the training courses. The charge is reasonable, but the huge amount of applicants has 
brought considerable profits. For instance, the days after the Chinese New Year is the rushing 
period when many rural labourers would leave their villages in order to find a salaried work in 
the city. During the ten days after the Chinese New Year of 2003, that is, between 8 and 18 
February 2003, in total, about 19,000 applicants had registered in the Xiamen Labour Market. On 
February 9th alone, the Xiamen Labour Market had received more than 2,400 applicants. There is, 
in fact, no data report of Xiamen Labour Market available. However, a report on Beijing’s labour 
recruitment business may provide a reference. In Beijing, there were in the year 2000 about 130 
officially registered labour recruitment agencies. The report reveals that their total profits in the 
year were nearly 800 million RMB (about 1 million US-$).  
 
On average, the profit of every agency meanwhile surpasses 6.15 million yuan (Zhang 2002: 9). 
Few businesses in China today can obtain such a huge amount of profits. 
 
In addition, as labour brokerage is a newly emerging business domain, the authorities concerned 
still regard it as a unit to provide public service rather than to run a business. Therefore, even 
until the end of the 1990s, those recruitment centers run or initiated by the respective government 
offices could still expect considerable funding from the government, although they derived there 
profits out of the market. For instance, in about five years, 1,102 re-employment centers had 
received 1,824 million yuan from government’s funding to run their services (Xiamen Daily, 13 
January 2003). In the 1990s it had become a popular model for many state-owned recruitment 
agencies to count on government’s financial support to run their business but benefit from the 
profits of the market at the same time.  
 
The profits of those small and informal labour agencies are considerable as well. In 2000, when I 
started my research on labour brokers, I revealed that those small recruitment agencies normally 
asked every applicant to pay about 50 yuan for an application form, which was a necessary step 
to become registered. The payment is not refundable, but the applicants could make their choice 
between two or three offers. When the applicants had got a job, they had to pay another 50 to 100 
yuan to the agency. I once made an observation outside of a small agency. It was a small room 
with two tables, one telephone and just a few chairs. One man and one woman worked there. 
Some papers pasted on the wall listed potential job offers. That morning, within two hours, more 
than ten people came in in order to inquire information and four had paid for an application form. 
I was told that the monthly rent of the room was 400 yuan. The monthly costs of running such an 
agency would not surpass 3,000 yuan including the salaries of two employees. It is obvious that 
labour brokerage is a business that can expect huge profits and quick returns. Moreover, to my 
surprise, my research in the days after the Chinese New Year of 2003 revealed that the payment 
for getting a job offer had risen from 200 to 1,000 yuan. According to the rules made by the 
relevant agencies, the payment includes so-called “training fee” or “certification fee”, but in fact 
few small agencies had provided serious training courses. Although it is argued that the payment 
will be refunded if no job could be provided, it is difficult for the applicants to get the total 
amount of payment back, as the agency does not inform the applicants within how many days a 
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job offer may be provided.  
 
Because labour brokerage is a highly profitable business, not a few people are interested to 
engage themselves in this field. Concerning the establishing of a recruitment business, the most 
difficult affair is to get a business license from the relevant authorities. According to an official 
report from March 2003, in Xiamen city only ten recruitment agencies for unskilled labourers 
were granted official licenses. Almost all of them were affiliated to one of the government’s 
bureaus. Only a few private labour agencies can expect to get full legal status since “it is too 
difficult to know what they are doing”, according to an official I have interviewed. The 
government expects to regularize employment organizations by setting up authorized institutions; 
however, the relevant authorities have never controlled the market as it was intended. For 
instance, in Malong, a small area located at the margins of Xiamen city, there exist a dozen of 
small labour agencies. None of them had ever got any legal business license. According to a 
report of Xiamen Daily, all these agencies were asked to stop running repeatedly. However, till 
November 2003, at least eleven of those agencies still continued to run their business (Xiamen 
Daily, 26 November 2003). 
 
In short, albeit the relevant authorities are trying to control the domain of labour brokerage by 
restricting the distribution of licenses, the tremendous profits which can be derived out of labour 
brokerage push people into that market. Consequently, labour brokerage business has become one 
of the sectors with very low credit standing.  
3.3 A sector with low credit standing 
Although the labour recruitment agencies run by the government are more reliable, many people 
looking for a job prefer to approach small and informal agencies. The reason behind that 
phenomenon refers to the following perspective. 
 
First, the authorized employment agencies are not able to meet the requests of all job seeking 
people. An official report published at the end of the 1990s states that all officially authorized 
legal recruitment agencies were running well. According to this report, on average, all of the 
“officially registered employment agencies” in Xiamen receive thirty thousand applicants per 
year and about 70 percent of the applicants have got a job via those agencies. Therefore, the 
success rate is very high. Meanwhile, the talents market has become the most attractive place for 
university graduates. Therefore, the report concludes that “employment agencies have become an 
important approach for the potential human resources to find a job in Xiamen; thus Xiamen 
labour market was heavily regulized” (XMNJ 1998:18). However, as large crowds of people are 
continuously entering the labour market, it is more and more difficult for authorized employment 
agencies to meet the huge demand. A report published in April 2003 shows that during the first 
three months of that year, the rate of applicants who have got a job via authorized recruitment 
agencies has decreased to 34 percent (Huang 2003). This is close to the results of my own 
research (cf. Table VII & Table VIII).  
 
Secondly, it is not easy for low-educated and unskilled job seekers to accept the operating model 
of authorized big labour agencies. For instance, as I have mentioned previously, in the 
recruitment hall of Xiamen Labour Market, there is a big electronic screen which provides job 
information. If somebody got the impression that a job offer suits to his situation, he may go to 
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the relevant counter to make a deal. However, many low educated and unskilled labourers do not 
like such a “distant and offish way”; furthermore, it is often difficult for them to understand the 
relevant information rolling on the electronic screen. Many prefer to have a face-to-face 
communication with the staff members. The informal but small labour agencies in turn provide 
such services. Therefore, although the government advices labourers not to approach illegal and 
“black” labour agencies, many still prefer to go to those agencies. 
 
Thirdly, my informants often complain about the staff members of the authorized labour agencies. 
This is another major reason why they approach inofficial agencies. In the Xiamen Labour 
Market, the staff members are government employees. Most of them are natives of Xiamen. In 
the eyes of job seekers from outside Xiamen, some staff members are snobbish and discriminate 
rural people. Sometimes, in order to organize a job fair, some well-known companies are asked to 
send a couple of representatives sitting in the recruitment hall, no matter whether or not they are 
interested to recruit new hands or not. Those people normally are impatient towards the rural 
labourers. In contrast, people working in small and informal agencies are more friendly. As the 
rural labourers in Xiamen are coming from certain areas, those small agencies usually turn to 
people coming from a specific area as a major target group. People from different provinces 
speak distinct dialects. Frequently the owners of those small and informal agencies stem from the 
same rural area and therefore are able to use the same dialect to communicate with their 
customers.  
 
Complaints towards those non-government run small labour agencies and negative statements 
have never stopped. From the perspective of the relevant government officials, many are very 
critical towards them. According to those officials, those labour agencies only collect fees but do 
not provide any serious help. The applicants have to pay for every offer provided by the labour 
agency. The offer however often turns out to be a contingent or non-standard work. Sometimes, 
when the applicant rushes to the location provided by the agency, the applicant was told that it 
was already too late as someone else had already taken over the position. Although dozens of 
such “illegal employment agencies” had been banned, similar complaints can still be heard.7 As I 
mentioned above, in Malong district of Xiamen city, dozens of labour recruitment agencies 
without licenses are running their businesses. They are frequently changing their names in order 
to avoid punishment. In accordance with the press clippings collected by the author, in the first 
ten months of 2003, there were in total 21 reports concerning employment brokerage in Xiamen 
published by Xiamen Daily. Among them, seven reports sharply criticized those “black 
employment agencies” by revealing how the relevant employment agencies fleeced rural 
labourers of their money. Thirteen of them were objective reports focusing on the general 
situation of Xiamen labour market, therefore reminding job seeking people to avoid cheating trap 
set by those black labour brokers. There is only one brief report giving a positive comment on a 
newly established private recruitment company. It is, therefore, no doubt that small labour 
brokerage possesses a bad image among the popular media.  
From the perspective of entrepreneurs, a shared opinion of contractors and directors of personnel 
departments of formal factories is that what they needed are unskilled workers. They would, 
therefore, prefer to recruit workers by themselves, rather than paying for the services of 
                                                        
7 Interview with Mr. CDH, the head of the Labour Bureau in Xiamen, February 5, 2000.  
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recruitment agencies. According to them, unskilled workers can be easily picked up even walking 
along the streets. Thus, why should they waste money and time to go through the procedure of 
labour agencies? I encountered the following case personally. In June 2001, a new joint-venture 
supermarket was going to recruit three hundred people for its two chain shops in Xiamen. Most 
positions were open for low educated and unskilled people. The supermarket made an 
advertisement in the local newspaper. The applicants were asked to send their application by 
normal mail within one week. The director received about ten thousand application letters. Such 
being the case, why should the employers contact any labour agencies? Therefore, the employers 
whom I interviewed argued that it was much easier to find cheap labour in the labour market. 
From the perspective of rural labourers, their attitudes towards the brokers are ambiguous. Some 
of them were cheated by brokers, but many of them agreed that brokers more or less had helped 
them to find a job. On the basis of the questionnaires that were distributed among those people, I 
explored the following data.  
 
Chart I: Approaches of finding one’s current occupations 
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Group one: Factory workers and labourers in informal economy sectors 
Group two: White-collars, including middle-level administrators, head of workshop or production lines, 
technicians, etc. 
A. Own efforts 
B. Introduced by family members or relatives 
C. Introduced by friends or co-villagers 
D. Introduced by contractors or employed by the employers directly 
E. Introduced by recruitment agencies 
F. Attracted from advertisement in newspapers or internet (only listed in the questionnaires for Group 2) 
G. Others 
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Table VII: Personal assessments of labour agencies / agents (%) 
 
Assessments A B C D E Average
Labour agency/agent has helped in 
some way 37.5 20.8 26.3 22.4 37.3 29.4 
Have never contacted any labour 
agencies 25.3 60.2 57.9 44.9 36.1 43.8 
Have approached labour agencies 
but did not receive any help 34.2 18.5 15.8 30.6 16.9 24.4 
No answer 3.0 0.4 0 2.0 9.6 2.4 
A. The respondents were people without a fixed occupation or still looking for a job when interviewed. 
B. The respondents were workers on construction sites. 
C. The respondents were workers in small-scale workshops (with approximately a dozen of employees). 
D. The respondents were workers in Taiwanese invested enterprises. 
E. The respondents were workers of European or American invested enterprises. 
 
Table VIII: The most workable approaches of finding a job in Xiamen (%) 
 
The most workable approaches Group One Group Two 
Advertisement in newspapers   16.7 
Internet  15.7 
Government-run recruitment agencies 3.0 36.8 
Rely on family members or relatives 17.6 6.4 
Rely on friends or co-villagers 14.4 24.5 
One’s own efforts 42.5  
Informal recruitment brokers 10.7  
Recruited by contractors or the owner 1.3  
Others  2.1  
Group one: Factory workers and labourers in informal economicectors.  
Group two: White-collars, including middle-level administrators, head of workshops or 
production lines, technicians, etc.  
 
From the data listed above it becomes obvious that concerning their assessment of the function of 
recruitment agencies, clear differences exist between the two groups. Among the white-collars, 
22 percent found their current jobs by means of the brokerage of talent markets and about 37 
percent of them regarded the talent markets as the best way to acquire a job. Among Group One, 
however, the positive response on the labour brokerage was merely about one third of that among 
Group Two; meanwhile, about half of them had never contacted any labour agencies.  
 
A couple of researches have provided interesting findings. A study on “rural workers” 
(nongmingong) was conducted in the three Chinese metropoles Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou 
in 1999. It reveals that among the graduates of secondary vocational schools, 7.7 percent have 
required their current jobs by means of the brokers of recruitment agencies; but the same rate 
among the graduates of primary middle schools drops to 2.4 percent and the rate becomes zero 
when the respondents are labourers who did not finish their primary education. The report’s 
conclusion is that private strong ties among the low educated rural migrants are important (Cao 
2001). On this point, it seems that there is no big difference between rural job seekers in 
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metropolises and those in provincial cities like Xiamen.  
 
Another research conducted by the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission and 
CICETE (China International Center for Economic and Technical Exchange) has addressed job 
seeking channels for female workers. 8  The team has distributed 724 questionnaires and 
collectively interviewed 132 people in 12 groups. 27 percent of the women interviewed got their 
employment through labor agencies, 24 percent through recommendation of relatives or friends, 
22 percent through government allocation after graduation, 9 percent through classified 
advertisements or want ads, and some of them through other channels, such as worker 
recruitment or succession to retired parents (NDRC 2003: 177).  
 
There is also a difference in the function of labour brokers, for instance in terms of large and 
small-scale enterprises. Among the female workers of state-owned and formal, large sized 
enterprises, about 40 percent were recruited through the labour market, but the same rate is less 
than 10 percent among female workers in the private and informal sector. It is worth noting that 
their research findings revealed significant differences between regions as well. In traditional 
industrial basis as they exist, for instance, in Shandong Province, about 65 percent of the female 
workers were recruited through labour markets, but in newly developed areas as in Guangdong 
Province, the same rate was below 10 percent. In the latter areas, strong ties like relatives and 
friends have played an important role in finding a job. Accordingly, more than 55 percent of the 
interviewees found their jobs through relatives and friends (NDRC 2003: 179).  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
First, it can be seen that nowadays in China it has become an attracting phenomenon that the 
reemergence of labour brokerage has been accompanied by the process of labour market 
restructuring. The social status of labour brokerage is continuously rising. Both government and 
labourers have to a certain degree accepted their existence and functions. Some have recognized 
that labour brokerage is an indispensable channel between employers and job-hunting people. 
Moreover, my research has found that, comparing professionals with unskilled job-hunters, a 
higher percentage of the former will ask for help from brokerage. The more interesting is, 
according to my research, that when unskilled labourers intend to find access to a better job as the 
one they currently have they need the help of brokerage. We may, therefore, conclude that 
brokerage contributes significantly to people’s upward social mobility. 
 
Secondly, a noted trend is that a kind of “friendly help” based on personal strong ties is changing 
into a chargeable business. There is no doubt that the strong ties of low educated migrants still 
possess an important function and the basis of an information network for recruitment in urban 
areas. The major nodes are their family members, relatives, friends and co-villagers. Apparently, 
all of these information exchanges are a kind of mutual help and free of charge. However, my 
further research has explored that few of them are “free lunch”. For instance, one of my 
informants came from a village in Jiangxi Province. She arrived in Xiamen in the mid-1990s. 
                                                        
8 This is a research team with strong government background. Their research has been conducted under the guidance 
of the relevant authorities.   
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According to her own description, she regards herself as a brave and capable woman who wanted 
to get a more qualified job than before. First, she tried to acquire information from her 
co-villagers and sometimes she also distributed information among the people she knew. After 
she heard about the function of labour agencies, she went to an agency and payed for its services. 
She tried to establish good relationships to people working in a government-run labour agency 
and learned how they handle their business. “In fact, it is very easy”, the woman told me. “Why 
should I pay for the information I got from the agencies and should not attempt to do the same by 
myself?” This is how she started to set up her own “recruitment agency”. But she could do that 
only among the people she was acquainted with, as she did not possess any license.9 This is an 
interesting case showing how social ties change into a kind of a business network. Similar cases 
have also been found among contractors, sub-contractors and workers of construction teams. In 
such cases, traditional ties have been used to enter a market and expand the initiator’s business.  
 
Thirdly, in Xiamen labour brokers still operate at a primary level, that is, they act as middlemen 
between employers and job hunting people. They can only compensate the existing personal 
information network, but do not constitute an active force to guide or regularize labour flow. In 
China, currently, the large rural-urban labour mobility has streamlined uncountable low educated 
job hunters into urban areas. As the cases described above demonstrate, the common labour 
market is one which requires primarily people without special skills. It is, therefore, an 
employers’ market. To a certain degree, labour brokerage reemerged due to the inflow of rural 
labourers into urban areas; it developed as there was a culturally and institutionally strong gap 
between rural and urban areas; it faced, however, serious challenges, as masses of rural 
labour-force began to overrun the cities. Then, a negative correlation has developed: as more 
employers can simply and directly recruit the workers they are in need, labour brokers can 
provide less job opportunities to their customers, and deeper disappointment of the job hunters 
may cherished with the labour brokers. By now the market situation in China is still imperfect. In 
particular labour brokerage is a market far from being standardized. More than anything else, 
there is a consensus that this sector is not a professional one but simply a “guanxi sector” 
(relationship sector). Its credit or business depends on how powerful the operators can handle 
their social contacts. The government-run institutions depend on the resources provided by the 
relevant authorities. The private agencies need to set up necessary contacts by themselves, from 
getting business licenses to having more job-offer approaches. A wider range of social contacts 
will lead to increased offers and therefore will attract more customers. Among job-hunting people, 
there exists a frequent exchange of information concerning the credit of the relevant labour 
agencies. When those people assess a certain one as “more powerful” that normally means that 
the relevant agency has more powerful relationship to channel people. Yet, finally, it will need 
more time to improve the operating model of labour brokerage and to standardize it. 
 
Fourthly, concerning the employers or institutions that need brokerage in terms of the labour 
market, many do not understand the standard model of brokerage. As mentioned above, 
historically seen, the job allocation system had dominated the PRC for several decades. During 
the 1990s, so-called re-employment centers were set up to provide services for lay-off workers. In 
the current labour market, it is obvious that labour resources are heavily oversupplied. Therefore, 
                                                        
9 This woman had to stop her “black business” when she was detained after someone complained about cheating. 
She was sent to a detention center for about one week since she could not (or did not want to) pay the penalty.  
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many entrepreneurs stand high above the brokerage. In a report written by a manager of a 
“headhunting agency”, the author points out that only “few enterprises in Xiamen are willing to 
pay for professional headhunting services”. For instance, according to the request of a company, 
the agency found a senior executive manager for the latter. However, when the agency asked the 
company to pay for that service, the latter was surprised and argued that only the person who 
required a job but not the employer needed to pay for that service (Wang 2003). That merely a 
few entrepreneurs understand the functions of labour brokerage properly has significantly limited 
the development of a formal and high quality labour brokerage. In 2001, I once visited a company 
operating in the talent market in Xiamen. Its name is China International Intellect Xiamen Corp., 
a branch of a respective company in Beijing. However, by the year 2003, as no profit could be 
derived from senior and formal headhunting business, this company has changed its business and 
now focusses on “overseas labour service and imports and exports trade”. 
Finally, among labour brokerage, transnational labour channeling is a field that needs much more 
research. This is a domain within which formally contracted labour exports and illegal human 
smuggling have lumped together. My research shows that in 2002 an applicant had to pay 50,000 
to 100,000 yuan for a package deal to be sent to work in a construction site in Israel. Such a huge 
amount of money is equal to a five or even ten years’ total income of a construction worker in 
Xiamen. According to some rural labourers I interviewed, although the Chinese government is 
executing strict regulations in order to punish the so-called snakeheads, some formal labour 
brokers are worse than snakeheads.10 It is extremely difficult to standardize the market for labour 
export abroad, as some companies are already operating transnationally.  
In general, no matter how difficult or how hard it still is, labour brokerage in China will continue 
to develop; more precisely, new labour agencies will being founded, and some of the existing 
ones will be eliminated through tough contests and some may develop by adapting themselves to 
the changing needs of the market. Yet, without doubt, an accomplished labour market needs a 
properly functioning labour brokerage.  
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